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The two largest minorities in the United States, African Americans and people of Hispanic 
origin, show official poverty rates that are at least twice as high as those among non-Hispanic 
Whites.  These  similarly  high  poverty  rates  among  minorities  are,  however,  the  result  of 
different combinations of factors, due to the specific characteristics of these two groups. In 
this paper, we analyze the role of demographic and labor-related variables in explaining the 
current differential in poverty rates among racial and ethnic groups in the United States and its 
recent evolution. Our results show, first, that these differentials were largely explained by 
differing family characteristics of the ethnic groups. Furthermore, we show that while labor 
market activity of family members and a preponderance of single mothers played a more 
significant role in explaining the higher poverty rates of Blacks, a larger number of dependent 
children is more closely associated with higher poverty among Latinos, who also suffer from a 
larger educational attainment gap and higher immigration rates. Finally, we show that both 
racial poverty gaps declined during the 1990s, and, in the case of Latinos, the downward trend 
has  continued  through  the  present  decade.  This  reduction  in  the  differentials  was  fully 
explained by characteristics, mainly the labor market performance of family heads, while the 
unexplained differential (conditional racial poverty gap) proved to be more persistent across 
time. 
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Introduction 
Most ethnic minorities in the United States have historically shown a low performance 
in  a  number  of  socioeconomic  indicators,  when  compared  with  majoritary  non-Hispanic 
Whites. Their share of the population is increasing, such that nowadays more than one in four 
Americans belongs to either of the two largest minorities, Blacks and Latinos. But the median 
per capita family income for these two groups is below 60 percent of levels for non-Hispanic 
Whites, and their poverty rate is at least twice as high. These minorities, which comprise half 
of all poor Americans, share similar socioeconomic and demographic patterns of deprivation in 
several other dimensions: they have lower education, health care insurance coverage, and a 
larger  risk  of  being  prison  inmates,  unemployed,  or  low-paid  workers.
1  Furthermore,  they 
share several demographic characteristics typically associated with disadvantaged groups, like 
having more dependent children in their families or a larger share of female-headed families, 
especially single mothers. However, both minorities also differ in a number of relevant aspects.  
Non-Hispanic Blacks account for a steady 13 percent of the overall population, most 
being  descendents  of  Africans  enslaved  in  North  America  between  the  1600s  and  1800s. 
However, 8 percent of non-Hispanic African Americans are foreign born, a percentage still 
below the 13 percent level observed among the overall population. After slavery was officially 
abolished in 1865, Blacks suffered from legal segregation and direct discrimination policies, 
which  were  removed  after  the  Civil  Rights  Movement,  although  other  forms  of  indirect 
discrimination persisted. They appear to have a larger incarceration rate than any other group, 
as well as a larger proportion of female-headed families and of young males out of work. It is a 
well-known fact that almost 70 percent of all Black children are born to unmarried mothers 
(US DHHS, 2004) and, consequently, about half of all Black children live with a single mother. 
Additionally, more than 11 percent of Black males aged 25 to 34 were incarcerated as of June, 
2006 (US DJOJP, 2007). Indeed, it comes as no surprise that these factors appear among the 
most common explanations for their higher poverty rates.  
On the other side, Hispanics have also a long history in the United States due to the 
annexation of half of the Mexican territory in the 1800s, but most are immigrants who arrived 
                                                              
1 As a matter of fact, 20 percent of Blacks and 34 percent of Hispanics had no health care insurance in 
2007,  compared  with  11  percent  of  non-Hispanic  Whites  (US  CB,  2007).  According  to  our  own 
estimations, unemployment rates in the same year were respectively 8.4 and 5.7 percent of the active 
population, compared with 4 percent of Whites; and 19 and 13 percent respectively of Black and Latino 
adults older than 25 went to college compared with 32 percent of Whites. An estimated 4.8 percent of 
Black men were in prison or jail in midyear 2006, compared with 1.9 percent of Hispanic men and 0.7 
percent of White men (US DJOJP, 2007). 3 
 
after the 1980’s from Latin America, especially Mexico, settling in the South and East portions 
of the country. As a consequence of rapid population growth, the number of Latinos passed 
from 10 to 45 million between 1970 and 2007 (from 5 to 15 percent of the total population), 
recently becoming the largest minority group in the country, with a population still growing 
faster than any other ethnic group’s.
2 The result of this recent migration process is that two in 
five Latinos are foreign born, and they have a higher fertility rate and a larger educational gap 
than any other group. 
In this paper, we aim to  identify the nature and evolution of higher poverty rates 
among African Americans and Latinos in the United States, and to asses to what extent they 
are  associated  with  the  poor  endowments  that  these  groups  have  in  terms  of  their 
demographic characteristics, their education attainment, or their labor market performance. 
Alternatively,  higher  poverty  rates  may  be  the  result  of  these  characteristics  being  less 
effective in pushing their families above the poverty line. Furthermore, we want to identify 
how the distinct features of Blacks and Latinos affect their poverty risks in different ways. In 
order to answer these questions, we estimated Logit poverty regressions and used an Oaxaca-
Blinder approach adapted to this specific framework to decompose the racial difference in 
poverty rates into characteristics and coefficients’ effects. This decomposition was undertaken 
at  two  different  levels:  at  the  aggregate  level,  we  estimated  the  joint  contribution  of  all 
characteristics and all coefficients respectively, while at the detailed level we identified the 
individual contributions of each set of characteristics and coefficients. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the following sections, we first describe the 
data  and  main  definitions,  then  review  and  compare  the  main  socioeconomic  patterns 
between  racial  groups  in  the  United  States.  After  this,  we  introduce  the  decomposition 
technique  and  present  our  empirical  results.  The  final  section  summarizes  the  main 
conclusions.  
Data and some definitions 
The data used for the analysis come from the Current Population Survey, 1994–2007 
Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) March Supplement, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
The universe of this survey was the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States 
living in housing units, and members of the armed forces living in civilian housing units on a 
                                                              
2 The U.S. Bureau of Census estimates a growth of 24 percent for the Hispanic population between 2000 
and  2006 (compared  with  6  percent for  the  overall population), with  a  projection  of 102.6  million 
Latinos by 2050, nearly a quarter of the whole population (US CB, 2008). 4 
 
military  base  or  in  a  household  not  on  a  military  base.  This  data  source  provides 
comprehensive monthly labor force data for persons 15 years old and over, as well as the 
families’ main characteristics. While demographic data refer to the time of the survey, data on 
employment and income refer to the preceding year.
3 
In this survey, people are asked to answer questions about their race and Hispanic 
origin. Since 2003, respondents have been allowed to report more than one race, making 
selections  from  six  distinct  race  groups:  White,  Black,  American  Indian  or  Alaskan  Native, 
Asian,  Native  Hawaiin  other  Pacific  Islander,  and  other  race.  Further,  this  survey  inquires 
whether  the  origin  of  each  person  is  Spanish,  Hispanic,  or  Latino.
4  On  the  basis  of  these 
questions, we broke up the population into five non-overlapping groups: non-Hispanic Whites 
(those  who  only  declared  this  race),  non-Hispanic  Blacks  or  African  Americans  (identifying 
themselves  as  non-Hispanic  and  Black,  either  alone  or  in  combination  with  other  races), 
Hispanics or Latinos (of any race)
5, Asian Americans (who further did not identify themselves 
as being Black or Hispanic), and others, even if we will focus the main analysis on the first 
three groups. For the sake of simplicity in what follows, we will refer to Blacks, Whites, or 
Asians while omitting their “non-Hispanic” origin. 
The  definition  of  poverty  used  in  this  paper  corresponds  to  the  official  poverty 
definition  employed  by  the  U.S.  Census  Bureau  following  the  Office  of  Management  and 
Budget’s (OMB) Statistical Policy Directive 14 (May 1978). It consists of a set of money income 
thresholds  that  vary  by  family  size  and  composition  to  determine  who  is  in  poverty.  If  a 
family’s total income is less than that family’s threshold, then that family and every individual 
in it is considered to live in poverty. The official poverty definition uses money income before 
taxes, and does not include capital gains or noncash benefits.
6 These thresholds are updated 
annually for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). For 2006, for example, these 
                                                              
3 In order to be consistent with Census Bureau publications, our income and poverty estimates refer to 
the year in which income was obtained, with characteristics as of March of the following year (the 
survey’s year). 
4 Until 2002, respondents could choose only one of five race categories (Asian and Pacific Islander were 
combined  in  one),  and  the  Hispanic  origin  was  determined  according  to  a  more  specific  question 
indicating the country of Hispanic origin. These changes make year-to-year comparisons more complex. 
5 About 0.5 percent of the entire population in 2007 identified themselves as being both Black and 
Latino, which means 4.5 percent of Blacks and 3.7 percent of Latinos. In this study, we classified them 
according to their origin (Latino), but given their relatively small size, the alternative of classifying them 
according to their race (Blacks) does not significantly change the results presented below. 
6 These absolute poverty thresholds were formulated in the mid 1960’s, with only minor adjustments 
since, and have been widely criticized not only for the limited notion of income used, but also because 
they  have  not  reflected  any  changes  in  lifestyle  or  in  consumption  standards  since  they  were 
established. However, they still constitute the main reference for all poverty analysis in the United 
States.  5 
 
limits were $10,488 for one person under 65 years old and $20,444 for a family of two adults 
with two related children under 18. 
Racial profiles in the United States 
Persistence of high poverty rates in the United States, with levels higher than those of 
the majority of the developed world, has been so far well documented, as has the fact that 
that the distribution of income has become more unequal and polarized.
7 Additionally, there is 
also a large differential in wellbeing across U.S. ethnic and racial groups, as well as increasing 
racial polarization resulting from the growing proportion of American minorities at the bottom 
of United States’ income distribution. On average, Black and Latino minorities are poorer than 
Whites in the United States, as Table 1 reports. The median family incomes of Blacks and 
Latinos in 2006 were respectively $35,629 and 38,600, or in other words, around twice the 
poverty threshold, below two thirds of the level reported by Whites, $60,000 (or 3.7 times the 
poverty line). Dividing family income by the corresponding poverty threshold, it turns out that 
the income of the median Black and Latino families are around twice that level, compared with 
3.7  times  in  the  case  of  Whites.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  doubt  that  races  are  unevenly 
distributed across family income classes in the United States.
8 In 2006, American minorities 
outnumbered Whites at the lower tail of the distribution, as evidenced in Figure 1b. Among 
them, Blacks and Latinos accounted for between 40 and 50 percent of the population in the 
bottom  three  deciles,  compared  with  only  10  to  20  percent  in  the  upper  four  deciles. 
Comparing Figures 1a and 1b, it can be observed that there was an increase between 1993 and 
2006 in the number of Hispanics all along the distribution, but especially below the median, 
mostly replacing Blacks in the first decile and Whites in the next ones. It does not come as a 
surprise that poverty rates among  African American and Hispanic minorities in the United 
States, 24.3 and 20.8 percent respectively, were between 2.5 and 3 times higher than among 
Whites (8.3 percent) in 2006.
9 What is more, not only was the incidence of poverty higher, but 
                                                              
7 Only Mexico and Russia report higher poverty, inequality, and polarization levels than the United 
States. See LIS key figures for Gini index of inequality and relative poverty around 2000, and Duclos, 
Esteban, and Ray (2004) for polarization around 1995. 
8 This is family income divided by the poverty line, in order to take into account implicit equivalence 
scales in the official poverty definition. 
9 Examples of recent detailed analysis of poverty in the United States are Iceland (2006) or Rodgers 
(2006). 6 
 
the median poverty gaps of Black and Latino poor exceeded the Whites’ level by 26 and 15 
percent, respectively.
10  
Table 1. Income and poverty by racial and ethnic groups in the United States 
Race 
































Whites  66.1  60,324  100  0.452  8.3    7,776  100  13,500  100  6,444  100 
  (0.12)  (331)    (0.001)  (0.09)    (90)    (79)    (78)   
Blacks  12.6  35,629  59.1  0.488  24.2  15.9  8,512  109.5  16,242  120.3  8,134  126.2 
  (0.09)  (544)    (0.003)  (0.32)  (0.23)  (140)    (128)    (124)   
Hispanics  15.1  38,600  64.0  0.446  20.8  12.5  11,000  141.5  20,444  151.4  7,388  114.6 
  (0.09)  (395)    (0.002)  (0.25)  (0.37)  (127)    (117)    (110)   
Asians  4.7  71,002  117.7  0.459  9.9  1.6  8,051  103.5  16,227  120.2  8,444  131.0 
  (0.05)  (1,382)    (0.004)  (0.37)  (0.38)  (381)    (376)    (357)   
Others  1.5  42,550  70.5  0.475  19.8  11.6  8,753  112.6  16,242  120.3  8,342  129.5 
  (0.03)  (1,385)    (0.007)  (0.68)  (0.68)  (444)    (437)    (311)   
All  100  52,693  87.3  0.467  12.4    8,643  111.1  16,227  120.2  7,188  111.5 
    (249)    (0.001)  (0.09)    (65)    (61)    (56)   
Linearized standard errors in parentheses 
Figures 1a-1b. Racial and ethnic distribution by family income deciles 
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The official poverty rate in the United States declined during the 1990’s economic 
boom, as Figure 2 shows, from 15.1 percent of the overall population in 1993, the highest level 
in many years, to 11.3 percent in 2000. This downward poverty trend was reversed after the 
economic recession in 2000, climbing to a level of 12.7 percent in 2004. Noteworthy was the 
fact that American minorities witnessed the largest decline in poverty rates during the 1990s: 
from 32.9 percent to 21.8 among Blacks (1993-2000), and from 30.6 to 21.2 among Latinos 
                                                              
10 Regarding the other minorities, American Indians, who accounted for less than 1 percent of the 
population, performed worse than the largest minorities, while Pacific Islanders had a poverty rate 
similar to the average of the population, and Asian Americans faced a risk that was only slightly higher 
than that of the majoritarian group, even if the intensity of poverty was the largest (the median gap was 
30 percent above that of Whites). 7 
 
(1993-2001), compared with a more moderate reduction from 9.9 to 7.5 among Whites. As a 
consequence, the difference between the poverty rates of each minority and the majoritarian 
group, referred here as the raw racial poverty gap, substantially declined in both cases: from 
23.0 percentage points in 1993 to 14.4 in 2000 in the case of Blacks, and from 20.7 to 13.6 in 
2001 in the case of Hispanics. After the recession,  the performance of the two minorities 
diverged, however; the racial poverty gap continued declining in the case of Americans of 
Hispanic origin after 2003, but steadily increased for Blacks, with rising poverty rates among 
this group between 2000 and 2005. 


















What are the reasons for these differences in poverty rates among racial and ethnic 
groups? Obviously, they may be the result of the specific characteristics of the families they 
live in. Clearly, these differentials may be explained to some extent by the fact that minorities 
are more likely to live in the poorest areas, to have more children, to live in single-mother-
headed families, work fewer hours, or be employed in low-paid occupations. Let us briefly 
review some of these differences in the relevant attributes. 
First, ethnic minorities are unevenly distributed across the U.S. geography and are 
overrepresented in regions with the highest poverty levels, even if this is not expected to 
substantially increase their poverty risk due to the low range of variation of poverty across 
regions in the United States. Indeed, as Table 2 reports, both minorities were more likely to 
live in the south-central eastern region, where the poverty rate was 16 percent in 2006, and 
Hispanics were also more likely to live in the south-central western region, where the poverty 
rate was 17 percent. However, most Hispanics and Blacks actually lived in regions with poverty 8 
 
rates between 10 and 12 percent.
11 Furthermore, these minorities were also more likely to live 
in  the  largest  metropolitan  areas  (more  than  2.5  million  inhabitants)  than  in  the  non-
metropolitan ones, which actually had the highest poverty rates.
12 









Distribution of population (%) 2007 
Whites  Blacks  Hispanics  All 
New England  65,100  10.1  5.9  2.3  2.2  4.8 
  (1,197)  (0.31)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.1)  (0.05) 
Middle Atlantic  57,799  12.2  13.7  14.1  11.5  13.5 
  (817)  (0.25)  (0.12)  (0.27)  (0.21)  (0.10) 
East North Central  54,454  11.6  18.1  15.2  6.6  15.4 
  (559)  (0.22)  (0.13)  (0.27)  (0.15)  (0.10) 
West North Central  54,697  10.6  8.5  3.4  2.1  6.7 
  (713)  (0.24)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
South Atlantic  51,000  11.6  18.3  33.3  14.5  19.2 
  (548)  (0.19)  (0.13)  (0.34)  (0.22)  (0.10) 
East South Central  43,438  16.2  6.6  9.7  1.2  5.9 
  (883)  (0.40)  (0.08)  (0.22)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
West South Central  45,010  16.7  9.4  12.7  19.9  11.4 
  (772)  (0.29)  (0.10)  (0.26)  (0.25)  (0.09) 
Mountain  51,472  12.0  7.2  1.9  10.8  7.1 
  (739)  (0.27)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.17)  (0.06) 
Pacific  56,460  11.7  12.4  7.4  31.3  16.2 
  (669)  (0.20)  (0.11)  (0.20)  (0.28)  (0.10) 
Non Metropolitan  56,287  14.9  23.9  13.4  8.2  19.5 
  (373)  (0.19)  (0.13)  (0.24)  (0.15)  (0.10) 
Metropolitan             
100,000 - 249,999  64,470  12.3  8.2  6.2  5.5  7.3 
  (736)  (0.31)  (0.09)  (0.18)  (0.13)  (0.07) 
250,000 - 499,999  67,294  12.6  10.5  9.1  8.1  9.6 
  (715)  (0.28)  (0.10)  (0.21)  (0.17)  (0.08) 
500,000 - 999,999  70,082  12.3  9.5  7.6  10.2  9.5 
  (673)  (0.27)  (0.10)  (0.19)  (0.18)  (0.07) 
1,000,000 - 2,499,999  76,361  11.1  17.6  18.5  13.2  16.8 
  (629)  (0.20)  (0.13)  (0.28)  (0.20)  (0.10) 
2,500,000 - 4,999,999  83,911  10.6  15.8  22.0  19.6  17.6 
  (672)  (0.20)  (0.12)  (0.30)  (0.24)  (0.10) 
More than 5,000,000  81,821  12.7  14.5  23.2  35.3  19.6 
  (704)  (0.21)  (0.12)  (0.32)  (0.30)  (0.11) 
Linearized standard errors in parentheses 
Blacks and Latinos are also characterized by having different living arrangements than Whites, 
as Table 3 demonstrates, and this is expected to have an impact on their higher poverty rates. 
Both populations were less likely to live in married-couple families in 2007: 62 percent of 
Hispanics and only 40 percent of Blacks, compared with 68 percent of Whites; only 6 percent 
                                                              
11  Blacks  were  more  likely  to  live  in  Georgia,  Florida,  or  Maryland  (south  Atlantic),  in  Mississippi, 
Alabama, or Tennessee (eastern south central), and in Louisiana (western south central). Latinos were 
more likely to live in California (Pacific), Texas (western south central), and Florida (south Atlantic). 
12 Note, however, that we cannot consider here the effect on poverty caused by residential segregation 
within metropolitan areas, with minorities living in poor inner cities and Whites in rich suburbs. 9 
 
of those living in this type of family were poor in 2006. On the contrary, Blacks were more 
likely to live in a female-headed family without a spouse present (45 percent), compared with 
the other main groups (respectively 20 percent for Whites and 24 for Latinos). The single-
female headed type of family faced a poverty risk 10 percentage points higher than that of 
male-headed families without a spouse present. More specifically, minorities had also a larger 
share of people living in single-mother families: 15.6 percent among Hispanics and 26.5 among 
Blacks, compared with only 6.6 among Whites.
13 These families reported a higher poverty rate 
than any other type (38 percent). Furthermore, Latinos, and to a lesser extent Blacks, are more 
likely  to  have  larger  families,  as  shown  at  the  bottom  of  Table  3:  their  families  had  3.5 
members on average in 2007 (compared with 3.0 in the case of Blacks and 2.9 of Whites), with 
more dependents of all ages among them, but especially children (1.25 compared with 1 and 
0.76  respectively).  As  a  consequence,  43  percent  of  Hispanic  family  members  were 
economically dependent, compared with 38 percent among Blacks and only 25 percent among 
Whites. 
Poverty  risk  among  people  in  families  headed  by  a  non-American  citizen  was  22 
percent, twice as high as in the other cases, including those headed by either naturalized 
foreign-born or second-generation immigrants. This appears to be particularly relevant for the 
Hispanic population, given that 40 percent were thus situated, compared with only 2 percent 
of  Whites and  5 percent  of  Blacks. Family heads, and the  general population, tend  to  be 
younger among Hispanics and Blacks than among Whites, and this is another factor that might 
increase the poverty levels of minorities, considering that poverty risk declines with the age of 
the family head, and was especially high for young-headed families (32 percent were poor 
when the head was below 24 years old); this group comprised 10 percent of Hispanics, 8 
percent  of  Blacks,  and  only  5  percent  of  Whites.  Another  characteristic  that  clearly  is 
distinctive of minorities is the level of attained education. Only 11 percent of Hispanics family 
reference  persons  went  to  college,  compared  to  18  percent  of  Blacks  and  33  percent  of 
Whites. A similar gap was found amongst the population as a whole. 
                                                              
13 There is no consensus about the causes of changes in marriage, divorce, and nonmarital childbearing 
that occurred during past decades leading to this situation. Changes in social norms, declining wages 
among low-skilled men, and the unintended incentives of the welfare system have been pointed out 
among the possible explanations (MacLanahan, 2007). 10 
 









Distribution of population (%) 2007 
Whites  Blacks  Hispanics  All 
Family type             
Couple  71,500  5.7  67.9  40.0  61.9  63.6 
  (341)  (0.07)  (0.16)  (0.36)  (0.30)  (0.13) 
Male without spouse  31,542  17.1  12.3  14.5  13.9  12.8 
  (476)  (0.29)  (0.12)  (0.27)  (0.23)  (0.09) 
Female without spouse  25,557  27.9  19.9  45.5  24.2  23.6 
  (277)  (0.24)  (0.14)  (0.37)  (0.26)  (0.11) 
without children  26,000  19.8  13.3  19.0  8.6  13.2 
  (403)  (0.30)  (0.12)  (0.29)  (0.18)  (0.10) 
with children  25,000  38.2  6.6  26.5  15.6  10.5 
  (366)  (0.37)  (0.07)  (0.33)  (0.22)  (0.08) 
Sex (reference person)             
Male  60,338  8.1  54.0  36.9  50.6  51.6 
  (361)  (0.10)  (0.16)  (0.35)  (0.30)  (0.13) 
Female  44,524  17.0  46.0  63.1  49.4  48.4 
  (340)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.35)  (0.30)  (0.13) 
Citizenship  
(reference person)             
Native, native parents  55,200  11.5  88.4  87.1  23.9  74.9 
  (291)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.25)  (0.26)  (0.11) 
Native, foreign parents  50,500  11.8  6.6  2.3  20.4  8.5 
  (842)  (0.28)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.24)  (0.07) 
Foreigner, naturalized  58,616  10.0  3.0  5.7  15.8  7.1 
  (1,065)  (0.28)  (0.06)  (0.17)  (0.22)  (0.07) 
Foreigner, non-naturalized  37,440  21.8  2.1  4.9  39.9  9.6 
  (645)  (0.33)  (0.05)  (0.17)  (0.30)  (0.07) 
Age (reference person)             
15-24  23,154  31.9  5.1  8.1  9.9  6.2 
  (533)  (0.52)  (0.08)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.07) 
25-55  60,000  11.7  65.8  71.3  77.0  68.6 
  (306)  (0.10)  (0.16)  (0.33)  (0.26)  (0.13) 
56+  43,448  9.23  29.1  20.5  13.2  25.2 
  (497)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.29)  (0.21)  (0.12) 
Educational attainment  
(reference person)             
Primary  27,000  29.78  9.0  17.2  39.1  14.7 
  (308)  (0.30)  (0.10)  (0.27)  (0.30)  (0.09) 
Secondary  48,000  12.37  58.2  65.2  49.4  56.8 
  (312)  (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.35)  (0.27)  (0.12) 
College  90,400  3.53  32.9  17.7  11.5  28.4 
  (391)  (0.09)  (0.16)  (0.37)  (0.28)  (0.13) 
      Average values 
Dependents      Whites  Blacks  Hispanics  All 
No. of members      2.88  3.03  3.52  3.01 
      (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.004) 
No. of dependents      0.99  1.42  1.79  1.19 
      (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.003) 
Aged <15 years      0.76  1.01  1.25  0.87 
      (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.003) 
Aged 16+      0.23  0.41  0.54  0.32 
      (0.002)  0.005)  0.005)  0.002) 
Family dependency ratio (%)      25.3  37.6  42.9  30.0 
      (0.09)  (0.23)  (0.19)  (0.08) 
Linearized standard errors in parentheses 
Labor Market performance 
Labor market performance varies greatly across ethnic and racial subpopulations, as is 
shown in Table 4. Latinos and Whites participate in the labor market at a higher rate than 
Blacks. The employment rate of Hispanic and White adults (15 years or older) was 63 and 62 
percent respectively in 2006, compared with 57 percent of Blacks. A similar pattern can be 
found for family reference persons, even if in this case, the differential in employment rates 
was smaller: 70 and 69 percent for respectively Latinos and Whites compared to 65 percent for 11 
 
Blacks. However, these aggregate figures concealed several specific features of each group. 
Hispanic males had the largest employment rates: 74 percent compared with 68 of Whites and 
57 of Blacks; while Hispanic females, on the contrary, had the lowest employment rate, 52 
percent  compared  with  about  56  percent  of  Blacks  and  Whites.
14  Further,  there  was 
substantial occupational segregation by ethnic groups in the labor market, where Whites were 
more likely than any other group to work in managerial and professional jobs in the private 
sector or to be self-employed. Note also that Blacks were more likely than Hispanics to work in 
skilled jobs or in the public sector, as well as to be unemployed, but were less likely to be self-
employed. Despite the fact that there was no significant difference in the average number of 
hours and weeks worked by employed adults, the  earnings of Black and Hispanic  workers 
were,  respectively,  70  and  65  percent  of  the  Whites’  level,  as  shown  in  Table  5.  Several 
reasons, including wage discrimination, have been pointed out for explaining these racial and 
ethnic gaps in earnings. For example, Antecol and Bedard (2004) have emphasized the role of 
labor market attachment differences among young males, as have Carneiro, Heckman, while 
Masterov (2005) argued that the major source of economic disparity by race and ethnicity in 
U.S. labor markets was to be found in pre-labor factors. 
                                                              
14 The highest employment rate of Hispanic males was intimately related to their large immigration rate. 
Indeed, the employment rate of Hispanic males born in a foreign country was 88 percent, in contrast 
with 71 percent of those born in the United States, similar to the 73 percent level of non-Hispanic White 
males in the same situation. 12 
 
Table 4. Population by labor status in 2006 
 
Labor market status 
and occupation 








Distribution of population (%)  Poverty 
Rate 
% 
Distribution of population (%) 
White  Black  Hispanic  All  White  Black  Hispanic  All 
Inactive  31,202  23.2  28.9  29.8  25.9  28.4  18.8  35.3  38.2  33.0  35.3 
  (395)  (0.21)  (0.15)  (0.33)  (0.27)  (0.12)  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.41)  (0.33)  (0.14) 
Unemployed  31,628  31.4  2.3  5.0  3.8  2.9  23.5  2.6  5.2  3.8  3.1 
  (1,070)  (0.71)  (0.05)  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.20)  (0.15)  (0.05) 
Employed  64,300  7.2  68.8  65.2  70.3  68.7  5.6  62.1  56.6  63.2  61.6 
  (311)  (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.35)  (0.28)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.18)  (0.42)  (0.35)  (0.15) 
full-time private sector, MP  93,480  1.9  15.2  10.6  7.1  13.8  1.7  12.7  8.6  6.2  11.6 
  (837)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.23)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.24)  (0.17)  (0.10) 
part-time private sector, MP  81,200  6.2  3.2  1.9  1.2  2.7  5.0  2.8  1.5  1.0  2.4 
  (1,799)  (0.40)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.44)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.05) 
full-time private sector, non MP  51,000  7.9  22.6  28.3  40.0  25.9  6.1  20.9  24.8  36.2  23.4 
  (360)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.11)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.37)  (0.36)  (0.12) 
part-time private sector, non MP  38,271  20.0  6.7  7.8  8.6  7.0  12.5  8.6  7.9  9.4  8.5 
  (660)  (0.39)  (0.08)  (0.21)  (0.17)  (0.07)  (0.34)  (0.10)  (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.08) 
public sector, MP  85,502  2.3  6.1  5.6  3.1  5.5  1.9  5.4  4.6  2.7  4.9 
  (1,032)  (0.16)  (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.17)  (0.08)  (0.17)  (0.11)  (0.07) 
public sector, non MP  64,212  5.0  4.6  7.4  3.9  4.9  3.7  3.8  6.3  3.1  4.0 
  (714)  (0.24)  (0.07)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.27)  (0.07)  (0.20)  (0.12)  (0.06) 
self-employed  74,845  6.2  10.4  3.6  6.5  8.9  6.1  7.8  3.0  4.6  6.8 
  (1,184)  (0.20)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.07)  (0.27)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.07) 
  MP= managerial or professional. Linearized standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 5. Employed population: average time worked and earnings 
  Reference person  All 
  Whites  Blacks  Hispanics  All  Whites  Blacks  Hispanics  All 
Weeks  47.8  47.5  47.8  47.8  46.7  46.2  46.9  46.7 
  (0.06)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.26)  (0.17)  (0.04) 
Weekly hours  40.4  39.9  40.1  40.3  39.0  38.8  39.1  39.0 
  (0.07)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.19)  (0.14)  (0.04) 
Annual earnings  47,930  33,863  31,504  44,248  43,928  32,011  28,777  40,615 
  (332)  (516)  (442)  (255)  (332)  (688)  (395)  (184) 
Linearized standard errors in parentheses 
During  the  economic  expansion  of  the  1990’s,  the  employment  rate of Blacks and 
Latinos  (but  not  of  Whites)  increased  for  most  subgroups  according  to  gender,  age,  and 
education, as reported in Table 6 for those not enrolled in further education. However, the 
increase  was  especially  marked  for  females  below  55  years  old  with  no  college  studies, 
amounting  to  between  7  and  12  percentage  points,  depending  on  age  and  minority.  The 
2000’s did not significantly reverse these improvements. The fact that the employment rates 
of low-educated young Black males did not witness any significant progress during the last 
economic booms has been a big academic issue to date. Among the possible explanations for 
this  phenomenon  were  mentioned  the  direct  and  indirect  consequences  of  large  and 13 
 
increasing incarceration rates (even in a context of decreasing criminality), and the migration 
of jobs from inner cities to suburbs.
15 
Linearized standard errors in parentheses 
Another remarkable feature of labor force participation that is expected to have an 
impact on poverty is the dramatic increase of employment rates for single mothers during the 
1990s’  economic  boom.  This  was  especially  important  for  Blacks  and  Hispanics,  as  they 
showed,  respectively,  14  and  22  percentage-point  increases  as  shown  in  Table  7.  This 
unprecedented shift into work was the result of drastic changes in economic incentives faced 
after the mid 1990’s by welfare beneficiaries, mainly single mothers, combined with the strong 
economic boom that allowed welfare reform to be implemented thanks to low unemployment 
and readily available jobs (Blank, 2002).
16 
                                                              
15 For example Holzer, Raphael and Stoll (2006) argued that the high rates of crime and incarceration 
among young Black males limit the employment opportunities not only of those directly engaged in such 
behavior, but also of those not engaged in crime due to statistical discrimination by employers. Further, 
Foster-Bey (2006) found evidence supporting that spatial mismatch in the blue-collar sector affected 
labor participation of young males residing in the urban core of metropolitan areas. 
16 In particular, as the result of reforms in the social assistance programs through the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, and increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit and minimum 
Table 6. Employment rate by age, gender, and attained education 
(adults 15 years old or over, not enrolled in further education) 
 
Male  Female 
White  Black  Hispanic  White  Black  Hispanic 
  1993  2001  2006  1993  2001  2006  1993  2001  2006  1993  2001  2006  1993  2001  2006  1993  2001  2006 
non College  60.5  60.1  60.5  50.6  52.3  51.3  67.6  71.5  75.2  44.4  44.7  44.2  41.0  45.6  47.4  39.1  46.4  46.3 
  (0.40)  (0.40)  (0.42)  (1.17)  (0.87)  (0.91)  (0.81)  (0.63)  (0.57)  (0.37)  (0.38)  (0.41)  (0.94)  (0.76)  (0.80)  (0.78)  (0.68)  (0.64) 
15-24  56.7  53.7  53.1  37.5  39.6  38.7  62.6  64.1  65.2  45.4  45.6  42.8  29.7  36.9  35.6  30.8  42.8  39.7 
  (1.13)  (1.05)  (1.10)  (2.57)  (2.07)  (2.16)  (1.80)  (1.44)  (1.36)  (1.18)  (1.06)  (1.19)  (2.46)  (2.03)  (2.11)  (1.77)  (1.66)  (1.59) 
25-55  81.7  81.1  80.9  64.1  66.6  66.1  78.5  82.5  85.5  67.0  68.9  67.6  54.7  61.7  64.3  48.4  56.4  56.5 
  (0.45)  (0.45)  (0.48)  (1.57)  (1.14)  (1.20)  (0.94)  (0.70)  (0.61)  (0.51)  (0.50)  (0.57)  (1.26)  (1.00)  (1.06)  (1.02)  (0.86)  (0.81) 
56+  27.4  28.9  31.7  24.2  27.6  25.6  29.1  32.6  40.1  17.4  19.5  22.5  19.9  20.0  23.7  19.0  18.9  21.6 
  (0.63)  (0.67)  (0.70)  (1.85)  (1.42)  (1.45)  (1.91)  (1.66)  (1.59)  (0.44)  (0.48)  (0.54)  (1.40)  (1.06)  (1.16)  (1.36)  (1.13)  (1.14) 
College  80.4  78.6  78.5  75.0  76.3  76.4  81.2  82.4  84.0  69.5  68.1  67.9  74.3  73.9  73.6  68.2  72.5  71.7 
  (0.33)  (0.31)  (0.32)  (1.46)  (0.89)  (0.92)  (1.13)  (0.89)  (0.78)  (0.38)  (0.34)  (0.33)  (1.11)  (0.75)  (0.76)  (1.29)  (0.98)  (0.84) 
15-24  85.4  84.3  87.3  71.4  69.6  78.6  79.2  82.1  80.9  86.5  85.0  83.9  75.0  76.5  71.9  72.3  75.4  77.8 
  (1.32)  (1.40)  (1.28)  (5.48)  (4.42)  (3.86)  (4.15)  (3.14)  (2.82)  (1.18)  (1.23)  (1.32)  (3.84)  (3.09)  (3.50)  (4.05)  (3.53)  (2.82) 
25-55  90.6  90.2  90.8  79.7  82.0  84.0  85.4  87.2  89.7  79.4  78.8  78.6  79.9  80.6  81.6  71.2  75.2  76.0 
  (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.28)  (1.55)  (0.93)  (0.97)  (1.14)  (0.89)  (0.78)  (0.39)  (0.33)  (0.34)  (1.15)  (0.79)  (0.79)  (1.41)  (1.05)  (0.90) 
56+  43.7  46.1  51.3  44.6  47.2  45.5  45.8  48.0  55.2  29.4  34.0  41.0  37.0  39.7  42.6  38.6  46.8  42.9 
  (0.88)  (0.78)  (0.70)  (4.38)  (2.48)  (2.23)  (4.49)  (3.38)  (2.64)  (0.80)  (0.74)  (0.70)  (3.34)  (2.00)  (1.83)  (4.32)  (3.49)  (2.46) 
All  70.4  70.1  70.5  58.6  62.0  61.5  71.0  74.3  77.6  55.8  57.1  57.7  53.2  57.9  59.4  46.3  53.5  54.4 
  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.94)  (0.65)  (0.68)  (0.68)  (0.53)  (0.47)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.27)  (0.76)  (0.56)  (0.58)  (0.69)  (0.58)  (0.53) 14 
 
Table 7. Employment rate of family heads 
 
White  Black  Hispanic 
1993  2001  2006  1993  2001  2006  1993  2001  2006 
Married couple  71.2  67.8  67.4  64.5  67.1  68.0  71.9  69.8  70.4 
  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.33)  (1.27)  (0.92)  (0.94)  (0.87)  (0.74)  (0.69) 
Male without spouse  70.4  68.6  69.9  62.1  64.1  62.6  76.3  75.8  81.1 
  (0.56)  (0.53)  (0.52)  (1.68)  (1.09)  (1.12)  (1.33)  (1.06)  (0.84) 
Female without spouse                   
without children  49.3  50.4  51.7  49.3  51.0  55.6  52.0  55.3  55.9 
  (0.54)  (0.53)  (0.54)  (1.38)  (0.97)  (0.98)  (1.58)  (1.34)  (1.24) 
with children  67.8  78.3  75.0  54.1  68.5  69.4  45.1  67.2  68.8 
  (1.11)  (0.78)  (0.86)  (1.61)  (1.22)  (1.31)  (1.90)  (1.63)  (1.45) 
Linearized standard errors in parentheses 
Methodology 
We  examined  the  contribution  of  a  number  of  family  characteristics  to  the  differential  in 
poverty rates among racial groups in the United States by applying an extension of the well-
known regression-based Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition approach to the probability of being 
poor.
17 In our framework, the ith person in group g is considered poor when his or her family 
income 
g
i y   falls  below  the  poverty  line  z.  Then,  under  a  Logit  probabilistic  model,  the 
likelihood of this person being poor (
g
i P ) is given by 
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where  F  represents  the  logistic  probabilistic  cumulative  distribution, 
g
i X   is  a  vector  of 
characteristics describing i’s family, and 
g β ˆ  is the associated vector of coefficient estimates. 
We estimated regressions separately for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. 
Given that being officially poor means that a family lacks enough income to make ends 
meet, we included among the explanatory variables a number of characteristics of the family 
reference person that may influence his or her ability to earn income: demographic variables 
such as gender, age, attained education (primary, secondary, or college), citizenship (native 
with/without foreign born parents, foreign born naturalized, or not naturalized), and mover 
status (change of residence in the previous year), as well as a set of variables describing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
wage  “cash  assistance  became  far  less  available,  welfare  recipients  were  pushed  much  harder  to 
employment  and  leave  the  rolls,  the  returns  to  low-wage  work  rose,  and  the  availability  of  work 
supports (child care and health insurance) increased to low-income families” (Blank, 2002, 1108). 
17 See Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). 15 
 
labor force participation of the head and, in the case of those employed, the characteristics of 
the job. These variables included several types of occupation according to the sector (private 
or public), contract (part or full-time), required skills (managerial/professional occupation or 
not), employment status (self-employed or employee), and the number of weeks and average 
weekly hours worked. We also included the type of family, as this may also affect the ability of 
the family head to get a job: we distinguished among families composed of a married couple, 
with additional distinction according to the sex of the head, and those composed by a male or 
a female without a spouse present. In the case of female heads, we additionally distinguished 
whether or not there are children in order to identify single mothers, with an interaction 
variable indicating whether she is employed or not. Given that family income can also be 
provided by other family members and that the presence of dependents may increase family 
needs  but  not  income,  we  included  the  number  of  other  family  members  as  well, 
distinguishing the number of dependents (of different ages) from the number of labor and 
nonlabor income receivers (by education attained and gender, and in the case of employed, 
also by age and characteristics of the job). Other variables included were the geographic region 
of residence and the size of the metropolitan area, in order to take into account potential 
differences in economic opportunities. Since we estimated the probability of a person being 
poor with all explanatory variables collected at the family level, our estimated robust standard 
errors took into account individuals being “clustered” across families.
18  
This simple econometric specification allows us to identify the statistical association 
between  the  probability  of  being  poor  and  each  family  attribute,  when  the  other 
characteristics are controlled for. However, we should be cautious in interpreting the results, 
as no control for possible endogeneity sources was made, and no causal relationship can be 
assessed.
19  Thus,  these  regressions  have  to  be  understood  in  the  context  of  poverty 
decompositions by subpopulations where, unlike standard poverty decomposition techniques, 
we identify the statistical association between each characteristic and the probability of being 
poor while controlling for the rest of attributes. 
An interesting property of the logit specification in our framework is that the head-
count ratio of poverty in group g, 
g H , is equal to the average predicted probability for this 
group (with population 
g N ): 
                                                              
18 See, for example, Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) for a justification of this. 
19 For example, consider the potential double causality in the case of the number of dependent children 
in the family. A large number of children directly affects the probability of being poor by increasing 
family needs (through the official poverty line) while not providing additional income. However, this 
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This  property  allows  us  to  use  the  average  estimated  probabilities  to  break  the  observed 
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The first term is the aggregate characteristics effect, and the second one is the aggregate 
coefficients effect. There is wide consensus on this type of decomposition in the case of non-
linear probability regressions.
20 
To evaluate the individual contribution of each variable (or set of variables) to the total 
explained difference, which is usually referred to as the detailed decomposition, we follow the 
method  proposed  by  Yun  (2004),  which  is  valid  for  any  nonlinear  function  F  and  is  a 
generalization  of  the  decomposition  of  Even  and  Macpherson  (1990,  1993),  of  only  the 
characteristics effect.












































X , (5) 
where 
k
X W∆  and 
k W β ∆  are, respectively, the individual relative contributions of characteristic k 
(k=1,…, K) to the overall characteristics and coefficients effects such that: 
                                                              
20 See, for instance, Gang et al. (2006) and Bhaumik et al. (2006) for the analysis of intergroup poverty 
rates in India  and Kosovo, or Biewen and Jenkins (2005) and Quintano and D’Agostino (2006) who 
examined  intercountry  differences  in  poverty  levels.  A  similar  decomposition  is  found  in  other 
(nonlinear)  contexts:  Gomulka  and  Stern  (1990)  analyzed  changes  in  the  employment  of  married 
women; Ham et al. (1998) analyzed intercountry differences in the duration of unemployment; Farlie 
(1999, 2005) analyzed racial discrepancies in the transition rate into self-employment and in computer 
ownership; Nielsen (1998, 2000) analyzed the gender discrepancy in formal sector employment and 
child labor incidence; Bevelander and Nielsen (2000) analyzed the employment success of immigrants; 
and  Gang  et  al.  (2002)  analyzed  attitudes  toward  foreigners  in  the  European  Union.  Alternative 
decomposition strategies of the aggregate effects can be found in Borooah (2005), Borooah and Iyer 
(2005a,b) and Even and Macpherson (1990, 1993). 
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g g X F β , was approximated with that of the function evaluated at the sample average 
of the exogenous variables,  ) (
________
g g X F β , and then (ii) a first-order Taylor-series expansion was 
used to linearize the characteristics and the effects of coefficients around the sample mean.
22 
This technique has a few advantages over other proposed methods that appear in the 
literature. First, the weights are quite transparent and simple to compute, because this only 
requires estimates of the coefficients and sample means for the characteristics. Second, this 
procedure  overrides  the  problem  of  path  dependency  that  is  common  to  all  sequential 
approaches to nonlinear models, in which values of characteristics and/or coefficients of one 
group need to be switched with those of the other group.
23 Third, unlike these sequential 
approaches,  the  detailed  characteristics  effect  can  be  obtained  without  making  any 
assumptions to match individuals of one group with the characteristics of another.
24 Finally, 
the original Oaxaca-Blinder approach is shown to be a particular case of this decomposition 
when F is a linear function. 
However, an additional and well-known problem which needs to be addressed is that 
detailed  decompositions  of  the  coefficients  effects  suffer  from  severe  identification 
difficulties.
25 This is because the contribution of a dummy variable to this effect will vary with 
the  choice  of  reference  group,  and  this  applies  to  any  set  of  dummy  variables.
26  For  this 
                                                              
22 An alternative linearization strategy can be found in Doiron and Riddell (1994). 
23 Sequential approaches have been applied, for instance, to detailed decompositions of both effects 
(Gomulka and Stern, 1990) and of only the characteristics effect (Farlie, 1999, 2005; Ham et al., 1998). 
The latter involves computing an average of all possible permutations of characteristics to override path 
dependency. 
24 Sequential approaches require that a matching assumption be imposed. For instance, Fairlie (1999, 
2005) drew a random subsample from the largest group, equal in size to the smallest group. Both groups 
of observations were ranked according to their predicted probabilities and matched by their respective 
rankings when computing the change in the characteristics effect. The final estimate was produced by 
computing the mean effect after repeating this exercise a large number of times. 
25  Jones (1983)  pointed  out  the  problem  of  identifying  the  contribution  of  the  intercept  using  the 
approach of Blinder (1973) in the presence of a set of dummy variables. Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) 
showed, more generally, that conventional decompositions cannot identify the separate contribution of 
dummy  variables  because  it  is  only  possible  to  estimate  the  relative  effect  of  a  dummy  variable. 
However,  Gelbach  (2002)  argued  that  the  problem  is  not  of  identification,  but  of  population 
heterogeneity in parameter estimates. 
26 However, as Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) stressed, the combined estimated contributions of all sets of 
dummy variables – including the constant term – to the overall coefficients effect are invariant with 
respect to the reference group. 18 
 
reason,  several  researchers  have  undertaken  detailed  decompositions  of  only  the 
characteristics effect, which is not affected by this problem.
27 To tackle this difficulty, we use 
normalized regressions in computing weights in (5), as proposed by Suits (1984), Gardeazabal 
and Ugidos (2005) and Yun (2005a, b). This method has the advantage of being invariant with 
respect to the “left-out” reference category in computing the contribution of dummy variables 
to the coefficients effect. Further, it alters neither the detailed characteristics effect, nor the 
contribution of continuous variables to the coefficients effect. 
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where there are L continuous variables X, M sets of categorical variables D, and where the mth 
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For the omitted categories in the original regression, it holds that  M m m ,..., 1 , 0 ˆ
1 = ∀ = β . In 
this way, we can compute the decomposition to identify characteristics and coefficient effects 
for each category, including the reference group, in the original equation.
28 
                                                              
27 Fairlie (1999, 2005) and Ham et al. (1998) are good examples of this in the nonlinear case. 
28  A  similar  problem  affects  affine  transformations  of  continuous  regressors that involve  a  location 
parameter.  As  Yun  (2005a)  pointed  out,  unlike  categorical  variables,  the  problem  related  to  a 
continuous variable cannot be resolved, because there are infinitely many transformations. Therefore, 
one has to rely on specifications that make sense and are widely accepted in the literature. 19 
 
Finally, in order to provide information about the statistical significance of our 
results, standard errors will be provided following the Delta method sketched in Yun 
(2005b). 
Regression results 
The analysis of decomposition of the racial poverty gap is based on the estimation of 
multivariate Logit regressions explaining the likelihood of a person being poor conditioned by 
family characteristics. The results for all racial and ethnic groups using three different surveys, 
1994, 2002, and 2007 (with results referring respectively to poverty in 1993, 2001, and 2006) 
are presented in the Appendix. In general, these results suggest that, in 2006, the coefficients 
are  similar  in  sign  for  all  groups,  although  they  may  differ  in  magnitude  and  statistical 
significance.  Due  to  the  necessity  of  omitting  one  category  in  each  set  of  dummies,  the 
benchmark person was someone who lived in a large city (5 million or more inhabitants) in the 
middle Atlantic region, in a married-couple family, where the head was a 15–24 years old 
male, born in the United States with American parents, with only primary school education, 
working full-time in the private sector in a non-managerial or professional occupation, who did 
not change residence in the previous year. Compared with this reference case, living in the 
Pacific region had a significant and negative effect on the risk of being poor in all groups, even 
if its magnitude was higher for Blacks. The lowest risk of being poor was achieved living in New 
England in the case of Blacks, in east north central in the case of Latinos, and in mountain and 
Pacific regions for Whites. Noteworthy is the fact that living in the south central regions, which 
showed the largest poverty rates, only increased the risk of being poor for Latinos (west south 
central  region).  Living  in  non-metropolitan  areas  increased  the  chances  of  being  poor  for 
Blacks  and  Whites,  while  for  the  latter,  poverty  risk  was  also  increased  by  living  in  small 
metropolitan areas (with populations of less than half a million). Families other than married 
couples were more likely to be poor in all three groups, with the effect being more intense in 
the case of Whites, for whom those families were less common, and less in the case of Blacks, 
who  were  more likely  to  have those living arrangements. Families  with many  dependents 
(especially adults) faced a higher risk of being poor. The older and more educated the family 
head, the lower the probability of being poor in all cases. Note, however, that while the effect 
associated with age was higher among Whites, the impact of college education was larger 
among both minorities. The effect associated with high school was similar in all three groups, 
however. The risk of falling into poverty increased for Blacks and Latinos when the head of the 
family was a non citizen, while this characteristic appeared to be non significant in the case of 20 
 
Whites,  for  whom  the  poverty  risk  was,  however,  lower  for  second-generation  immigrant 
family heads. It is also interesting to note that those families who had changed their residence 
during the previous year were also more likely to be poor in all cases.  
The risk of poverty increased when the head of the family was unemployed or worked 
in a part-time job, while it decreased when he or she worked in managerial or professional 
occupations in the private sector. The effect was especially strong for Latinos if they worked as 
managers or professionals in the public sector, while it was not significant for the other groups 
in the same situation. The effect of working in the public sector in a non-managerial job or as a 
self-employed worker was only significantly positive in the case of Whites. The more weeks 
and the more weekly hours worked by the family head, the lower the poverty risk, with the 
effect of weeks being larger in the case of Whites and Blacks, and hours in the case of Latinos. 
The  presence  of more  employed adults in  the  family  was  generally  associated  with  lower 
poverty. This latter effect increased with their attained education and was higher in more 
skilled occupations and lower in the case of females and the self-employed. Interestingly, the 
presence of young workers without college studies had a significant effect on reducing poverty 
in the case of Latinos, but not in the case of Blacks. More weeks worked by other family 
members  also  reduced  poverty  risk,  while  the  average  of  weekly  hours  worked  was  only 
significant and negative in the case of Blacks. The effect of other nonlabor income receivers 
was large and significant in all groups. 
Explaining the racial poverty gap 
Poverty rates among Blacks were 15.9 percentage points higher than among Whites in 
2006, and the decomposition analysis of this differential, presented in Table 8, shows that this 
could be largely explained by the characteristics effect. That is, 12.2 percentage points (76.6 
percent)  of  this  raw  racial  poverty  gap  for  Blacks  can  be  attributed  to  differences  in  the 
observed family characteristics of both groups, which means that the conditional racial poverty 
gap—that prevailing if Blacks shared the characteristics of Whites—was 3.7 percentage points 
(the remaining 23.4 percent), as shown in Table 9. Table 8. Racial poverty gap: aggregate and detailed characteristics effects 
 
  Blacks  Hispanics 
1993  %  2001  %  2006  %  1993  %  2001  %  2006  % 
RAW GAP  23.0  100  14.6  100  15.9  100  20.7  100  13.6  100  12.5  100 
  (0.45)    (0.31)    (0.23)    (0.39)    (0.29)    (0.37)   
AGGREGATE CHARACTERISTICS EFFECT  19.5  84.6  10.8  74.1  12.2  76.6  19.0  91.8  11.1  81.5  9.5  76.0 
                 DETAILED:  (0.53)    (0.45)    (0.39)    (0.81)    (0.59)    (0.54)   
1. Geographic  0.3  1.2  -0.2  -1.5  -0.1  -0.6  -0.2  -0.8  -0.1  -0.6  -0.4  -2.9 
  (0.51)    (0.36)    (0.31)    (0.81)    (0.36)    (0.34)   
  1.1 State  0.8  3.4  0.6  3.8  0.4  2.5  0.7  3.4  0.2  1.5  0.0  0.0 
  (0.43)    (0.27)    (0.22)    (0.76)    (0.30)    (0.28)   
  1.2 Metropolitan area size  -0.5  -2.1  -0.8  -5.2  -0.5  -3.0  -0.9  -4.2  -0.3  -2.1  -0.4  -2.9 
  (0.20)    (0.20)    (0.18)    (0.37)    (0.23)    (0.24)   
2. Sociodemographic  8.5  36.8  5.2  35.3  5.6  35.3  11.9  57.7  8.1  59.8  6.5  51.9 
  (0.93)    (0.54)    (0.50)    (0.91)    (0.66)    (0.58)   
  2.1 Family type  3.3  14.4  1.8  12.6  1.8  11.2  0.4  2.2  0.3  2.1  0.4  3.2 
  (0.80)    (0.45)    (0.45)    (0.23)    (0.13)    (0.13)   
  2.2 Mobility  0.8  3.7  -0.1  -0.5  0.4  2.4  5.0  24.3  3.4  24.7  1.9  15.1 
  (0.33)    (0.19)    (0.15)    (0.82)    (0.56)    (0.52)   
  2.3 Age of head   0.9  4.1  0.9  6.2  1.1  7.0  1.4  6.7  0.9  6.7  0.9  7.1 
  (0.12)    (0.10)    (0.11)    (0.22)    (0.18)    (0.18)   
  2.4 Dependents  3.4  14.6  2.5  16.9  2.3  14.7  5.1  24.5  3.6  26.3  3.3  26.5 
  (0.33)    (0.21)    (0.19)    (0.44)    (0.32)    (0.28)   
      2.4.1 Aged 0–15 years  3.2  13.8  2.3  15.6  2.1  13.5  4.8  23.2  3.3  24.0  3.1  25.0 
  (0.32)    (0.20)    (0.19)    (0.42)    (0.30)    (0.27)   
      2.4.2 Aged 16–45 years  0.1  0.6  0.1  1.0  0.1  0.9  0.3  1.2  0.2  1.6  0.2  1.3 
  (0.04)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.07)    (0.04)    (0.04)   
      2.4.3 Aged 46+ years  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.7  0.0  0.2 
  (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)   
3. Education and labor activity  9.4  41.1  5.4  37.1  6.0  37.6  6.8  32.8  2.5  18.7  2.5  19.9 
  (0.76)    (0.41)    (0.38)    (0.59)    (0.49)    (0.40)   
  3.1. Family Head  6.8  29.6  2.8  18.9  2.3  14.4  5.8  28.3  2.3  16.8  2.6  20.9 
  (0.76)    (0.44)    (0.38)    (0.55)    (0.38)    (0.33)   
      3.1.1 Education of head   1.7  7.4  1.1  7.4  0.9  5.5  3.5  16.8  1.6  12.1  2.2  17.8 
  (0.27)    (0.13)    (0.12)    (0.46)    (0.32)    (0.29)   
      3.1.2 Labor activity of head  5.1  22.1  1.7  11.5  1.4  8.9  2.4  11.4  0.6  4.7  0.4  3.1 
  (0.75)    (0.42)    (0.37)    (0.41)    (0.29)    (0.24)   
          3.1.2.a Inactive  0.1  0.4  0.0  -0.2  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.6  0.0  0.0 
  (0.24)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.04)    (0.04)   
          3.1.2.b Unemployed  0.2  0.7  0.1  0.9  0.2  1.2  0.2  1.2  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.7 
  (0.11)    (0.07)    (0.05)    (0.07)    (0.04)    (0.02)   
          3.1.2.c Employed (by occupation)  -0.1  -0.6  0.4  2.9  0.3  1.8  0.6  2.8  0.6  4.1  0.7  5.6 
  (0.62)    (0.39)    (0.34)    (0.37)    (0.29)    (0.25)   
          3.1.2.d Average weeks and weekly hours worked  5.0  21.6  1.1  7.8  1.0  6.0  1.5  7.5  -0.1  -0.6  -0.4  -3.2 
  (0.35)    (0.07)    (0.06)    (0.14)    (0.01)    (0.03)   
  3.2 Other members  2.6  11.5  2.7  18.2  3.7  23.2  0.9  4.5  0.3  1.9  -0.1  -1.0 
  (0.67)    (0.37)    (0.34)    (0.55)    (0.44)    (0.36)   
      3.2.1 Employed (by occupation, education, sex and age)  0.4  1.7  0.4  2.6  1.3  8.2  -0.1  -0.5  0.3  1.9  -0.2  -1.7 
  (0.71)    (0.40)    (0.39)    (0.56)    (0.44)    (0.36)   
      3.2.2 Average weeks and weekly hours worked  2.3  9.8  2.3  15.6  2.4  15.0  1.0  5.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.8 
  (0.53)    (0.34)    (0.36)    (0.17)    (0.01)    (0.01)   
4. Nonlabor incomes: other nonworking family members  
Receiving nonlabor income (by education and sex)  1.3  5.5  0.5  3.2  0.7  4.2  0.4  2.2  0.5  3.6  0.9  7.0 
  (0.31)    (0.13)    (0.11)    (0.21)    (0.16)    (0.16)   
Standard error in parentheses: Linearized standard errors (Raw Gap), and Delta standard errors (aggregate and detailed effects). Table 9. Racial poverty gap: aggregate and detailed coefficients effects 
 
  Blacks  Hispanics 
1993  %  2001  %  2006  %  1993  %  2001  %  2006  % 
RAW GAP  23.0  100  14.6  100  15.9  100  20.7  100  13.6  100  12.5  100 
  (0.45)    (0.31)    (0.23)    (0.39)    (0.29)    (0.37)   
AGGREGATE COEFFICIENTS EFFECT  3.5  15.4  3.8  25.9  3.7  23.4  1.7  8.2  2.5  18.5  3.0  24.0 
                 DETAILED:  (0.58)    (0.48)    (0.40)    (0.74)    (0.53)    (0.51)   
1. Geographic  -2.7  -11.9  0.2  1.4  0.3  2.0  1.3  6.1  -0.4  -2.9  -0.2  -1.9 
  (1.27)    (0.21)    (0.22)    (0.98)    (0.17)    (0.12)   
  1.1 State  -0.1  -0.4  0.2  1.1  0.3  2.1  0.1  0.5  -0.2  -1.6  -0.2  -1.2 
  (0.22)    (0.14)    (0.17)    (0.26)    (0.11)    (0.09)   
  1.2 Metropolitan area size  -2.6  -11.5  0.0  0.3  0.0  -0.1  1.2  5.6  -0.2  -1.3  -0.1  -0.7 
  (1.22)    (0.14)    (0.13)    (0.92)    (0.10)    (0.06)   
2. Sociodemographic  3.5  15.2  2.1  14.1  1.7  10.4  -1.1  -5.3  -0.4  -3.2  0.9  7.1 
  (1.84)    (0.97)    (1.08)    (0.87)    (0.52)    (0.50)   
  2.1 Family type  -0.5  -2.4  0.3  2.2  0.7  4.6  -0.1  -0.6  0.1  0.6  0.4  3.4 
  (0.73)    (0.34)    (0.39)    (0.43)    (0.20)    (0.18)   
  2.2 Mobility  3.2  14.0  1.1  7.6  -0.6  -4.1  -1.6  -7.5  -1.0  -7.7  -0.1  -0.9 
  (1.47)    (0.76)    (0.91)    (0.82)    (0.49)    (0.40)   
  2.3 Age of head   0.9  4.0  0.1  0.9  1.0  6.2  0.6  2.9  0.5  3.6  0.7  5.4 
  (0.53)    (0.29)    (0.38)    (0.34)    (0.20)    (0.18)   
  2.4 Dependents  -0.1  -0.4  0.5  3.4  0.6  3.6  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.2  -0.1  -0.7 
  (0.49)    (0.35)    (0.45)    (0.31)    (0.19)    (0.18)   
      2.4.1 Aged 0–15 years  0.0  -0.1  0.6  3.8  0.7  4.5  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.8  0.1  0.4 
  (0.48)    (0.35)    (0.46)    (0.31)    (0.19)    (0.17)   
      2.4.2 Aged 16–45 years  0.0  -0.2  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.7  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.4  -0.1  -0.8 
  (0.04)    (0.03)    (0.05)    (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.03)   
      2.4.3 Aged 46+ years  0.0  -0.1  0.0  -0.3  0.0  -0.2  0.0  -0.2  0.0  -0.2  0.0  -0.3 
  (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)   
3. Education and labor activity  0.7  2.9  -1.3  -9.2  -1.6  -10.3  3.5  16.8  1.3  9.6  1.9  15.2 
  (2.06)    (1.62)    (2.02)    (1.30)    (0.93)    (0.77)   
  3.1. Family Head  0.7  3.0  -2.2  -15.3  -0.6  -3.9  2.9  14.0  1.1  7.9  1.4  11.3 
  (1.74)    (1.40)    (1.53)    (1.31)    (0.85)    (0.70)   
      3.1.1 Education of head   0.0  -0.1  -0.3  -2.0  -0.4  -2.3  -0.2  -1.1  0.1  0.9  -0.2  -1.6 
  (0.23)    (0.19)    (0.26)    (0.18)    (0.13)    (0.13)   
      3.1.2 Labor activity of head  0.7  3.1  -1.9  -13.2  -0.3  -1.6  3.1  15.2  1.0  7.0  1.6  12.9 
  (1.72)    (1.35)    (1.49)    (1.35)    (0.84)    (0.69)   
          3.1.2.a Inactive  0.8  3.3  0.0  -0.2  0.5  3.1  0.4  2.0  0.0  -0.1  0.5  3.7 
  (0.51)    (0.34)    (0.43)    (0.32)    (0.22)    (0.21)   
          3.1.2.b Unemployed  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.2 
  (0.07)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.03)    (0.02)   
          3.1.2.c Employed (by occupation)  -0.6  -2.5  -1.1  -7.3  -0.9  -5.8  0.0  0.0  0.2  1.6  -0.5  -3.9 
  (1.29)    (0.95)    (1.07)    (0.83)    (0.58)    (0.53)   
          3.1.2.e Average weeks and weekly hours worked  0.5  2.3  -0.9  -6.0  0.1  0.8  2.7  12.9  0.7  5.3  1.6  12.9 
  (1.34)    (0.95)    (1.09)    (1.09)    (0.60)    (0.51)   
  3.2 Other members  0.0  -0.1  0.9  6.1  -1.0  -6.4  0.6  2.8  0.2  1.7  0.5  3.9 
  (1.06)    (0.71)    (1.06)    (0.56)    (0.46)    (0.39)   
      3.2.1 Employed (by occupation, education, sex and age)  1.4  6.2  0.3  1.9  -1.8  -11.1  0.8  4.0  -1.3  -9.8  0.2  1.5 
  (1.37)    (0.89)    (1.17)    (0.81)    (0.63)    (0.45)   
      3.2.2 Average weeks and weekly hours worked  -1.4  -6.3  0.6  4.1  0.8  4.8  -0.2  -1.2  1.6  11.5  0.3  2.4 
  (1.62)    (1.01)    (1.21)    (0.77)    (0.51)    (0.50)   
4. Nonlabor incomes: other nonworking family members  
Receiving nonlabor income (by education and sex)  -0.2  -0.7  0.1  0.6  -0.5  -2.9  0.2  0.8  0.1  0.9  -0.3  -2.4 
  (0.57)    (0.32)    (0.34)    (0.29)    (0.20)    (0.18)   
5. Constant  2.3  10.0  2.8  19.0  3.8  24.1  -2.1  -10.3  1.9  14.1  0.8  6.0 
  (2.61)    (1.65)    (2.05)    (1.71)    (1.04)    (0.83)   
Standard error in parentheses: Linearized standard errors (Raw Gap), and Delta standard errors (aggregate and detailed effects). More  specifically,  as  shown  in  Table  8,  about  37.6  percent  of  the  raw  poverty  gap  was 
explained by differences in education attainment and the labor-market-related variables of all 
family members. As a matter of fact, the level of education and labor activity of the family 
head explained 14.4 percent of the gap, mainly due to lower numbers of weeks and hours 
worked (6 percent) and to the educational gap (5.5 percent). The gap in education and the 
labor activity of other family members explained an additional 23.2 percent. In this last case, 
the lower number of hours worked (15 percent) appears to be especially important, together 
with low participation and segregation of those actually employed in low paid occupations (8.2 
percent). An additional 4.2 percent was explained by non-labor incomes received by other 
members in the family (taking into account their education).  
Other non-labor related factors were crucial in explaining the higher poverty rates of 
Blacks  compared  with  Whites.  In  fact,  35.3  percent  of  the  raw  gap  was  explained  by 
differences in demographic characteristics, namely the larger number of dependent children in 
Black  families  (13.5  percent),  the  lower  proportion  of  married  couples  and  the  higher 
proportion  of  female-headed  families  (jointly  explaining  11.2  percent),  and  the  generally 
younger age of family heads (7 percent). The geographical area of residence appears to be 
irrelevant because the effect of the higher concentration of Blacks in the poorest states was 
statistically insignificant at 95 percent of confidence; farther, it was overcompensated for by 
the fact that Blacks were more likely to live in the largest metropolitan areas (which, in fact, 
has a negative contribution to the gap). This result strongly contrasts with the case of African 
Americans  in Brazil,  where  almost  17  percent of  their  higher  poverty rate  compared  with 
Brazilian Whites can be explained by the concentration of Blacks in the poorest states in the 
north and northeast of the country (Gradín, 2009). 
Among our other target group, the difference in poverty rates among Hispanics and 
Whites  in  2006  was  12.5  percentage  points,  and  observed  family  attributes  explained  a 
proportion  of  the  raw  gap  which  was  globally  similar  to  the  case  of  Blacks.  Indeed,  the 
characteristics effect accounted for 9.5 percentage points (76 percent of the total difference 
among  Hispanics  and  Whites),  resulting  in  a  conditional  poverty  gap  of  3.0  percent  (24 
percent).  Nevertheless,  the  underlying  reasons  for  the  higher  poverty  among  Latinos  are 
substantially different from those explaining the higher incidence among Blacks. For example, 
the sociodemographic characteristics of Hispanics were even more important and explained 
more than a half the overall racial poverty gap (51.9 percent), mainly due to a larger number of 
dependent children in Hispanic families, accounting for 25 percent, and to their immigration 
profile, which explained another 15.1 percent. The contribution of the young age of the family 24 
 
head to explaining the racial poverty gap was similar for Latinos and Blacks (7.1 percent), but 
not the type of family, which barely contributed 3.2 percent. 
Furthermore,  achieved  education  and  labor  activity  among  all  family  members  jointly 
explained about 20 percent of the raw poverty gap, way below the overall contribution of 
these variables for Blacks. Additionally, the driving  factors were also different for the two 
groups. The main contribution for Latinos in this case came from the lower level of education 
attained  by  Hispanic  family  heads,  which  explained  almost  18  percent  of  the  total  gap 
(compared with only 5 percent for Blacks). An additional 5.1 percent was attributable to the 
labor participation of family heads due to segregation into low-paid occupations; but, unlike 
Blacks, the larger number of hours these heads worked helped to partially compensate for this 
segregation (with a negative contribution of 3.2 percent). The participation of other family 
members in the labor market did not explain much of the gap in the case of Hispanics, due to 
the high employment rates of males, but non-labor incomes did explain a non-negligible 7 
percent. Finally, the geographical area where Latinos were living played no significant role, just 
as in the case of Blacks. 
Despite the fact  that observed characteristics  explained  a  large share  of  the  racial 
poverty  gap  for  Blacks  and  Latinos,  our  results  also  suggest  that  the  impact  of  certain 
attributes on poverty risk might be different for these groups compared with Whites, as is 
shown in Table 9. The aggregate coefficient effect is in all cases significant, even if most of the 
effects of grouped variables are not. Some of these significant differential effects appear to be 
particularly interesting. For example, the number of hours worked by Hispanic family heads 
was less effective than those worked by Whites in protecting their respective families from 
being poor, as it explained about 1.6 percentage points of the raw gap in poverty rates (13 
percent of the gap). Similarly, it appears that some demographic factors might be less effective 
in preventing poverty among Blacks and Latinos than among Whites, such as belonging to a 
married couple (3.4 percent of the gap for Latinos) or having an older family head (about 6 
percent of the gap for both minorities). 
Changing patterns across time 
The racial poverty gap experienced a sharp decline in the United States during the 
economic  boom  of  the  1990’s  due  to  larger  decreases  in  the  poverty  rate  among  U.S. 
minorities than among Whites, as was shown above. This reduction in the raw racial poverty 
gaps was driven by the characteristics effect in both cases, with conditional racial poverty gaps 
being near 4 percent in the case of Blacks, and increasing from 1.7 to 3 percentage points in 25 
 
the  case  of  Latinos  for  the  whole  period  1993–2006.  In  the  case  of  Blacks,  the  main 
responsibility  for  the  reduction  of  almost  9  percentage  points  in the  characteristics  effect 
between 1993 and 2001 (from 19.5 to 10.8), came from the lower contribution of the number 
of hours worked by the family head (from 5 to 1.1 percentage points), but demographics also 
played  a  role,  with  reductions  due  to  family  type  and  the  number  of  dependent  children 
(respectively from 3.3 to 1.8, and from 3.2 to 2.3 percentage points). This was directly related 
to the increasing employment rate of single mothers and an ongoing decline in the number of 
children  in  Black  families.  In  the  case  of  Latinos,  the  cause  for  a  7.9  percentage  points' 
reduction in the characteristics effect between 1993 and 2001 was more diversified, but was 
mainly related to the labor market performance of Latinos. In this last case, responsibility for 
the reduction was shared by the lower contribution of education, and the number of hours 
worked by the head (jointly explaining a 3.5 percentage points’ cut), and hours worked by 
other family members (about 1 percentage point). Nonetheless, the mobility status of the 
family head (1.6 percentage points), and the number of dependent children (1.5 percentage 
points) were important as well. Note, however, that since the beginning of the 2000s, the 
evolution of the racial poverty gap has been different for Blacks and Latinos. The trend in the 
gap was slightly reversed in the case of Blacks, increasing 1.3 percentage points between 2001 
and 2006 (from 14. 6 to 15.9), due to the higher contribution of employment of non-head 
family members (0.9 percentage points). At the same time, the gap for Latinos continued to 
decrease  1.1  percentage points,  pushed  mainly by  the  continuously  lower  effect  of  family 
head’s mobility (1.5 percentage points).  
Despite  the  break  imposed  by  the  recession  at  the  beginning  of  the  2000’s,  it  is 
interesting to highlight certain long run trends that continued during both periods and thus 
seem  to  be  less  affected  by  the  economic  cycle.  There  was  a  continuous  decline  in  the 
contribution of characteristics such as the family type and education of the head in the case of 
Blacks, and a catch-up in mobility in the case of Latinos, as well as the number of dependents 
and hours worked by the head for both groups. The only continuous increase observed was 
the  contribution  of  other  members’  employment  for  Blacks,  and  non-labor  incomes  for 
Latinos. 
Conclusions 
Family income in the United States is more unequally distributed and polarized than in 
most of the developed world, a situation partly due to a large gap in wellbeing among ethnic 
and racial groups. In this paper, we have analyzed the gap in poverty rates by ethnic and racial 26 
 
groups in this country, and found that it can be largely explained by their different family 
characteristics. We have also shown that the main reasons diverge when explaining why Blacks 
and Latinos are more likely to be poor than Whites. Almost half of what explains the higher 
poverty  of  Blacks  (37  percent  of  the  overall  gap)  can  be  attributed  to  their  demographic 
characteristics, especially the large number of dependent children, the family type, and the 
age of the family head. Of similar relevance is their education and performance in the labor 
market, especially the low labor market participation of family members other than the family 
head. On the contrary, in the case of people of Hispanic origin, at least two-thirds of what can 
be explained (more than half the raw gap) is attributable to the demographic characteristics of 
their families, with even more relevance of the number of children than in the case of Blacks, 
and with a special (even if decreasing) role played by their predominant immigration status, 
and with the younger age of their family heads being similar in relevance to the case of Blacks. 
As a consequence of the high employment rates of Hispanic males, the labor-market-related 
characteristics played a less fundamental role than in the case of Blacks, one almost fully 
accounted for by their larger educational gap. The state or region where minorities live played 
no role in explaining their higher poverty rates. Further, certain demographic characteristics, 
like the type of family or the age of the family head, and other labor variables, like the number 
of hours worked, were shown to have a different impact on the risk of being poor among 
minorities compared with Whites. 
Finally, we have shown that the reduction in the racial poverty gap during the 1990’s 
can be fully accounted for by the lower role played by differences in characteristics, especially 
those labor-related ones, while the conditional racial poverty gap has remained at a constant 
level among Blacks and is increasing among Latinos. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
the fact that characteristics account for the largest part of the racial poverty gap does not 
mean that discrimination is no longer relevant in explaining poverty among minorities in the 
United States, as the poorer characteristics of Blacks and Latinos could be partly the result of 
different  opportunities  in  access  to  education  and  well-paid  jobs,  and  additionally  there 
remain some significant coefficients effects. 
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Logit coefficients of the  
probability of being poor 
1993  2001  2006 
Whites  Blacks  Hispanics  Whites  Blacks  Hispanics  Whites  Blacks  Hispanics 
New England  -0.183  (.09)  -0.136  (.30)  0.368  (.25)  -0.266  (.09)  -0.263  (.25)  0.026  (.20)  -0.082  (.10)  -0.729  (.30)  0.205  (.22) 
East North Central  -0.036  (.08)  0.067  (.17)  -0.135  (.22)  -0.279  (.08)  -0.152  (.14)  -0.494  (.17)  -0.236  (.09)  0.053  (.17)  -0.407  (.18) 
West North Central  0.178  (.10)  0.177  (.28)  -0.131  (.55)  -0.081  (.09)  -0.306  (.20)  0.224  (.24)  -0.103  (.10)  -0.177  (.22)  0.027  (.21) 
South Atlantic  -0.008  (.09)  -0.006  (.18)  0.267  (.20)  -0.037  (.08)  -0.181  (.13)  -0.070  (.17)  -0.262  (.09)  -0.219  (.16)  -0.128  (.15) 
East South Central  0.250  (.11)  0.461  (.21)  -0.571  (.77)  0.037  (.10)  -0.144  (.17)  0.183  (.32)  0.140  (.11)  0.001  (.20)  0.160  (.29) 
West South Central  0.161  (.10)  0.548  (.19)  0.399  (.17)  -0.008  (.09)  0.115  (.16)  0.446  (.15)  -0.135  (.10)  0.226  (.18)  0.259  (.14) 
Mountain  0.017  (.10)  -0.076  (.35)  0.162  (.21)  -0.014  (.09)  -0.498  (.33)  -0.159  (.16)  -0.394  (.10)  -0.150  (.25)  -0.088  (.16) 
Pacific  -0.128  (.10)  -0.360  (.26)  -0.050  (.14)  -0.138  (.09)  -0.501  (.22)  -0.287  (.12)  -0.372  (.10)  -0.489  (.21)  -0.304  (.13) 
non metropolitan area  0.119  (.10)  0.179  (.18)  -0.417  (.15)  0.393  (.10)  0.584  (.18)  0.118  (.17)  0.468  (.09)  0.376  (.17)  0.196  (.14) 
0.1-0.25 million inhabitants  -0.047  (.15)  0.062  (.45)  -0.070  (.27)  0.105  (.12)  0.204  (.23)  0.110  (.19)  0.205  (.11)  -0.037  (.23)  0.103  (.15) 
0.25-0.5 million inhabitants  0.056  (.19)  0.511  (.33)  -0.046  (.35)  -0.033  (.11)  0.482  (.17)  -0.200  (.16)  0.224  (.10)  0.184  (.18)  -0.066  (.15) 
0.5-1 million inhabitants  0.420  (.23)  1.758  (.56)  -1.475  (.70)  0.058  (.11)  -0.054  (.17)  -0.003  (.15)  0.000  (.11)  0.116  (.18)  0.089  (.13) 
1-2.5 million inhabitants+  0.410  (.09)  0.288  (.16)  0.211  (.14)  0.024  (.10)  0.097  (.14)  -0.288  (.13)  0.071  (.10)  0.044  (.15)  -0.060  (.12) 
2.5-5 million inhabitants+  -    -    -    -0.161  (.12)  -0.056  (.16)  -0.708  (.17)  0.093  (.10)  -0.096  (.16)  -0.273  (.12) 
Family: female-headed married couple  -0.402  (.17)  -0.045  (.30)  -0.207  (.25)  -0.035  (.15)  -0.201  (.29)  -0.372  (.20)  -0.102  (.16)  0.239  (.25)  0.027  (.18) 
Family: Male (no spouse)  0.459  (.10)  0.479  (.23)  0.192  (.19)  0.589  (.10)  0.438  (.20)  0.435  (.14)  0.705  (.10)  0.490  (.19)  0.431  (.14) 
Family: Female (no spouse, no children)  0.940  (.10)  0.858  (.21)  1.129  (.16)  0.939  (.10)  0.770  (.19)  0.915  (.15)  1.036  (.10)  0.975  (.18)  0.668  (.15) 
Family: Female (no spouse, with children  0.696  (.14)  0.946  (.24)  0.790  (.22)  0.853  (.14)  0.611  (.22)  0.740  (.20)  1.179  (.14)  0.687  (.22)  0.764  (.17) 
Head: Native, foreign parents  -0.227  (.08)  -0.886  (.37)  0.391  (.14)  -0.184  (.08)  0.339  (.31)  0.275  (.12)  -0.160  (.10)  -0.099  (.27)  -0.005  (.11) 
Head: Naturalized American  -0.102  (.13)  -0.487  (.41)  0.383  (.19)  0.168  (.13)  -0.278  (.25)  0.375  (.14)  -0.121  (.14)  0.107  (.23)  -0.003  (.12) 
Head: Foreigner  0.762  (.16)  0.284  (.29)  0.875  (.14)  0.538  (.15)  -0.062  (.21)  0.693  (.12)  0.191  (.16)  0.454  (.20)  0.514  (.10) 
Head: moved within same county  0.387  (.07)  -0.041  (.14)  0.344  (.13)  0.277  (.07)  0.443  (.13)  0.617  (.13)  0.459  (.08)  0.317  (.13)  0.293  (.12) 
Head: moved from different county  0.261  (.09)  0.196  (.21)  0.494  (.22)  0.468  (.08)  0.161  (.17)  0.455  (.16)  0.367  (.10)  0.404  (.20)  0.176  (.16) 
Head: employed lone-mother  0.039  (.16)  0.155  (.25)  -0.129  (.24)  -0.036  (.15)  0.379  (.22)  -0.072  (.22)  -0.179  (.15)  0.103  (.22)  0.115  (.19) 
Head: 25-55 years old  -0.911  (.09)  -0.398  (.19)  -0.367  (.15)  -0.814  (.07)  -0.592  (.15)  -0.191  (.12)  -0.825  (.07)  -0.273  (.14)  -0.069  (.11) 
Head: 56+ years old  -2.392  (.11)  -1.555  (.23)  -1.279  (.20)  -2.298  (.10)  -1.508  (.18)  -0.858  (.17)  -2.350  (.09)  -1.515  (.17)  -0.653  (.15) 
Head: secondary education  -0.507  (.06)  -0.351  (.13)  -0.315  (.12)  -0.388  (.06)  -0.276  (.10)  -0.258  (.10)  -0.323  (.07)  -0.362  (.11)  -0.407  (.09) 
Head: College  -0.900  (.07)  -0.913  (.15)  -1.127  (.14)  -0.721  (.06)  -0.914  (.11)  -0.596  (.11)  -0.627  (.07)  -0.822  (.12)  -0.826  (.10) 
Head: inactive  -0.124  (.15)  0.364  (.25)  0.168  (.20)  -0.180  (.13)  -0.294  (.22)  -0.422  (.18)  -0.285  (.14)  -0.170  (.23)  0.008  (.17) 
Head: unemployed  0.560  (.14)  0.609  (.27)  0.796  (.21)  0.366  (.13)   0.407  (.23)  0.302  (.19)  0.495  (.15)  0.730  (.24)  0.622  (.20) 
Head: pv, mp  -0.476  (.15)  0.004  (.30)  -0.875  (.33)  -0.396  (.13)  -0.520  (.26)  -0.491  (.26)  -0.392  (.14)  -0.472  (.20)  -0.280  (.18) 
Head: pv, p-t, non mp  0.781  (.11)  1.201  (.20)  0.759  (.17)  0.727  (.11)  0.447  (.16)  0.612  (.15)  0.764  (.12)  0.615  (.18)  0.757  (.14) 
Head: pb, mp  -0.122  (.25)  -0.430  (.51)  -0.004  (.51)  -0.541  (.21)  -0.700  (.34)  -0.754  (.45)  -0.256  (.18)  -0.438  (.36)  -1.180  (.35) 
Head: pb, non mp  -0.281  (.18)  -0.471  (.27)  -0.354  (.30)  0.232  (.16)  0.128  (.21)  -0.197  (.23)  0.364  (.20)  -0.326  (.21)  0.057  (.24) 
Head: self-employed  1.154  (.12)  0.937  (.48)  0.915  (.23)  1.031  (.12)  0.961  (.32)  0.341  (.23)  0.494  (.13)  0.186  (.30)  0.221  (.18) 
Head: No. of weeks worked  -0.058  (.00)  -0.050  (.01)  -0.039  (.00)  -0.048  (.00)  -0.048  (.00)  -0.046  (.00)  -0.048  (.00)  -0.046  (.00)  -0.037  (.00) 
Head: No. of hours worked  -0.005  (.00)  -0.011  (.01)  -0.011  (.00)  -0.016  (.00)  -0.021  (.00  -0.013  (.00)  -0.017  (.00)  -0.019  (.00)  -0.016  (.00) 
No. children below 10 years old  0.525  (.04)  0.497  (.07)  0.521  (.06)  0.474  (.04)  0.546  (.06)  0.441  (.05)  0.463  (.04)  0.585  (.07)  0.418  (.05) 
No. children 10-15 years old  0.524  (.05)  0.539  (.10)  0.503  (.08)  0.397  (.05)  0.525  (.07)  0.530  (.07)  0.288  (.05)  0.477  (.07)  0.491  (.06) 
No. dependents 16-45 years old  0.508  (.07)  0.566  (.10)  0.632  (.08)  0.468  (.06)  0.584  (.09)  0.488  (.08)  0.566  (.05)  0.536  (.08)  0.469  (.06) 
No. dependents 46-64 years old  1.040  (.12)  0.790  (.22)  0.767  (.22)  1.222  (.12)  1.123  (.16)  0.742  (.15)  1.366  (.10)  0.907  (.16)  0.613  (.14) 
No. dependents 65+ years old  1.726  (.20)  0.709  (.48)  0.205  (.34)  2.198  (.27)  0.775  (.31)  0.960  (.26)  1.904  (.16)  1.224  (.24)  0.230  (.21) 
No. other employed, 15-45, primary  -0.379  (.19)  -0.650  (.41)  -0.780  (.23)  -0.003  (.16)  -0.175  (.33)  -0.119  (.19)  -0.234  (.20)  -0.252  (.33)  -0.332  (.18) 
No. other employed, 15-45, secondary  -0.727  (.19)  -0.760  (.31)  -1.092  (.27)  -0.470  (.17)  -0.235  (.31)  -0.280  (.22)  -0.378  (.18)  -0.408  (.30)  -0.387  (.19) 
No. other employed, 15-45, College  -0.983  (.20)  -0.784  (.35)  -1.478  (.31)  -0.916  (.19)  -0.588  (.30)  -0.437  (.26)  -0.730  (.18)  -1.506  (.37)  -0.832  (.23) 
No. other employed, 46+,  primary  -0.369  (.29)  -0.672  (.52)  -1.557  (.51)  0.335  (.34)  0.818  (.54)  -0.045  (.30)  -0.779  (.55)  0.108  (.46)  -0.492  (.27) 
No. other employed, 46+,  sec-College  -0.873  (.17)  -1.029  (.38)  -1.213  (.31)  -0.617  (.13)  -0.877  (.29)  -1.002  (.26)  -0.849  (.14)  -1.062  (.31)  -1.043  (.22) 
No. other employed, pv, mp  -0.865  (.21)  0.322  (.44)  0.418  (.42)  -0.891  (.16)  -0.337  (.35)  -1.325  (.37)  -0.468  (.15)  -0.387  (.28)  -0.416  (.26) 
No. other employed, pv, f-t, non mp  -0.393  (.13)  0.276  (.23)  -0.048  (.18)  -0.391  (.11)  -0.279  (.20)  -0.707  (.15)  -0.161  (.11)  -0.283  (.18)  -0.247  (.14) 
No. other employed, pv, p-t, non mp  0.135  (.13)  0.653  (.27)  0.793  (.23)  -0.045  (.12)  0.353  (.24)  -0.386  (.18)  0.138  (.14)  0.215  (.22)  0.248  (.17) 
No. other employed, pb, mp  -0.581  (.27)  -1.655  (.70)  -1.824  (.91)  -0.574  (.26)  -1.074  (.64)  -1.127  (.60)  -0.500  (.21)  -2.029  (.51)  -0.593  (.40) 
No. other employed, pb, non mp  -0.084  (.22)  -0.863  (.37)  0.264  (.33)  -0.200  (.19)  -0.343  (.29)  -0.294  (.29)  -0.912  (.25)  -0.492  (.29)  0.070  (.33) 
No. other self-employed,  0.592  (.14)  -0.381  (.50)  0.880  (.33)  0.487  (.13)  0.883  (.36)  0.190  (.26)  0.472  (.15)  0.039  (.38)  0.608  (.23) 
No. of other female employed  0.214  (.15)  0.116  (.27)  0.373  (.20)  0.531  (.16)  -0.063  (.26)  0.115  (.17)  0.266  (.16)  0.473  (.23)  0.388  (.16) 
Weeks worked by others  -0.023  (.00)  -0.023  (.01)  -0.034  (.01)  -0.029  (.01)  -0.028  (.01)  -0.021  (.01)  -0.035  (.01)  -0.020  (.01)  -0.031  (.01) 
Hours  worked by others  0.002  (.01)  -0.009  (.02)  0.013  (.01)  -0.016  (.01)  -0.012  (.01)  -0.009  (.01)  -0.008  (.01)  -0.020  (.01)  -0.008  (.01) 
No. other nonlabor income, primary  0.045  (.12)  0.072  (.17)  -0.624  (.18)  -0.171  (.12)  -0.456  (.19)  -0.438  (.16)  -0.364  (.16)  -0.259  (.19)  -0.583  (.16) 
No. other nonlabor income, secondary  -0.436  (.15)  -0.274  (.26)  -1.013  (.24)  -0.800  (.14)  -0.857  (.23)  -0.643  (.20)  -0.787  (.17)  -1.058  (.23)  -1.131  (.28) 
No. other nonlabor income, College  -0.802  (.17)  -0.674  (.32)  -0.899  (.27)  -1.126  (.17)  -0.846  (.33)  -0.580  (.30)  -0.805  (.19)  -0.948  (.24)  -0.683  (.23) 
N. other income female receivers  -0.436  (.15)  -0.657  (.25)  0.235  (.21)  -0.215  (.14)  -0.142  (.22)  -0.341  (.21)  -0.135  (.17)  -0.330  (.23)  -0.391  (.20) 
Constant  0.692  (.23)  0.429  (.39)  -0.103  (.34)  0.721  (.21)  1.093  (.34)  0.586  (.30)  0.669  (.21)  0.890  (.36)  0.295  (.28) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Observations are all individuals with full information, clustered by family.  
Abbreviations: pv=private sector, pb=public sector, p-t=part-time, f-t=full-time, p=managerial or professional occupation.  
+ In 1993 the last category of the size of Metropolitan area used in the regression was: 1-3 million, and the omitted value: more than 3 million. 
 
Summary of regressions  1993  2001  2006 
  Whites  Blacks  Hispanics  Whites  Blacks  Hispanics  Whites  Blacks  Hispanics 
No. of unweighted observations  109,642  14,916  19,452  149,032  24,874  29,327  132,853  23,840  34,125 
Log-likelihood  -20,976  -4,753  -6,940  -24,639  -7,284  -9,245  -21,969  -7,057  -10,802 
Pseudo R
2  40.7  49.7  42.1  39.9  45.0  39.3  41.6  46.4  37.9 
Wald χ
2(60)  3,998  1,043  1,268  4,509  1,417  1,361  4,089  1,305  1,628 
Probability ( > χ
 2 )  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
 